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Abstract
Chaney, Sraer and Thesmar (2012) find that over the 1993–2007 period, a $1 increase
in collateral (the value of real estate a firm actually owns) leads the representative
US public corporation to raise its investment by $0.06. We first demonstrate that
data Winsorization induces a strong bias in favour of finding this result. There is
no relationship ($0.00 per $1) between the value of real estate a firm owns and its
investment in the unaltered data. We also show that the identification approach based
on local variations in real estate prices does not provide evidence on the collateral
channel.
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In “The Collateral Channel: How Real Estate Shocks Affect Corporate Investment”, Chaney,
Sraer and Thesmar (2012)—henceforth, CST—study how variations in the value of real estate a
firm owns affects its level of investment. They find that over the 1993–2007 period, a $1 increase
in collateral (the value of real estate a firm actually owns) leads the representative US public
corporation to raise its investment by 6 cents ($0.06). CST emphasize the economic significance of
this sensitivity as real estate represents a sizeable fraction of the tangible assets that firms hold on
their balance sheet.
In this comment, we show the fragility of their findings on the collateral channel in two ways.
First, we show that Winsorization of data prior to the empirical analysis introduces a strong bias
in favour of finding evidence for the collateral channel. In the unaltered data there is no evidence.
The point estimate implies a 0 cent ($0.00) increase in the firm’s investment for a $1 increase in
the value of its real estate. We provide an explanation for why Winsorization produces the bias.
Second, even when the data is Winsorized as in CST, we demonstrate that their main quantitative
finding—the 6 cents sensitivity of investment to a $1 increase in the real value of collateral a firm
actually owns—is not robust to an econometric correction of their baseline specification and to the
presence of real estate shocks common to all real estate holding firms (aggregate shocks). We find
that the sensitivity of investment to local real estate shocks, as in CST, is −1.6 cents while the
sensitivity to aggregate real estate shocks is 4.5 cents. This finding shows that CST’s identification
strategy based on the comparison of investment by land-holding firms across areas with different
variations in real estate prices (page 2382) does not identify a firm’s investment sensitivity to each
additional dollar of real estate that the firm actually owns. We find no evidence for the collateral
channel when using the unaltered data in this specification.
I. Empirical Specification
The main empirical specification from CST (using the same notation as in their paper) is
INV lit = αi + δt + βREValueit + γP
l
t + controlsit + it(1)
where INV lit is investment by firm i at time t located in the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA)
l. Parameters αi are firm fixed effects and δt are time dummy variables designed to capture
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macroeconomic fluctuations in real estate prices. REValueit measures the market value of real
estate assets owned by firm i at time t. Due to data limitations, it is assumed that all real estate
owned by a firm is located in MSA l. P lt measures real estate prices at time t in area l, and
controlsit include the amount of cash on the balance sheet, the previous year’s ratio of the market
value of the equity to the book value of equity, and the interaction of residential real estate prices
with controls for ownership of real estate assets (i.e., quintile of firm age, return on assets, firm
sized measured by the total amount of assets, industry dummy and state dummy).1 All variables
except market value of equity to book value of equity are normalized by past year’s Property Plant
and Equipment (PPE).
Parameter β in (1) is the coefficient of interest in CST’s empirical analysis since it captures the
sensitivity of investment to variations in real estate value the firm actually owns.
Since real estate prices, and hence the value of real estate owned by a firm, are likely correlated
with its investment opportunities, CST use the Instrumental Variables (IV) approach. They use
the following first-stage specification
(2) P lt = α
l + δt + γE
l × IRt + ult
where αl are MSA level fixed effects, δt are time dummy variables. E
l are the housing supply
elasticities developed in Saiz (2010), and IRt is the nationwide real interest rate at which banks
refinance their home loans at time t.
II. Evidence for the Collateral Channel
A. The Effect of Winsorization
CST follow—Winsorization—a common practice in finance and labour economics studies to ‘clean
the data’.2 Winsorizing reduces values at the low and high ends of the sorted data to a pre-
determined cut-off point. As discussed in Bollinger and Chandra (2005), however, Winsorizing
1We use the data and programs available for the CST paper on the AER webpage. In addition, we
downloaded firm level financial data from COMPUSTAT via WRDS and followed instructions from the
readme file to merge this data with what is available on the AER webpage. All of our results use MSA level
real estate prices. Chaney et al. (2012) report results using office prices but note that all of their results hold
using MSA prices.
2See, for example, Grinold and Kahn (2000), Angrist and Krueger (2000), among others. Tukey (1962)
coined the term Winsorizing or Winsorization in honour of Charles P. Winsor.
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data can induce or exacerbate biases in estimation. We demonstrate that this problem is severe
for CST’s finding: their main result (6 cents increase in investment per $ 1 increase in the value of
real estate the firm owns) is obtained only if the data is Winsorized.
Specifically, CST use the following Winsorization rule:
Finally, to ensure that our results are statistically robust, all variables defined as ratios
are windsorized using as thresholds the median plus/minus five times the interquartile
range. CST, p. 2386
This Winsorization for the key variables of interest gives a cut-off of 1.72 for INV lit and 5.51 for
RE Valueit. In the data, the cut-off for these variables is binding only on the upper threshold of
the interquartile range. Therefore, the Winsorized data for these two variables used in estimation
is characterized as
INV lit =
{
1.72 if INV lit ≥ 1.72
INV lit Otherwise
(3)
REValueit =
{
5.51 if REValueit ≥ 5.51
REValueit Otherwise
(4)
Table 1 compares CST’s main result (left column) to the case when the data is unaltered (right
column). As shown in the table, the coefficient of interest (highlighted in bold) drops from 0.056
(nearly 6 cents increase in investment per dollar of increase in the value of real estate the firm owns)
to essentially zero cents. Importantly, this finding shows that Winsorization is not a robustness
exercise in the usual sense because without it, the estimated coefficient is not statistically different
from zero.
Why does Winsorization have a drastic effect on CST’s findings? The intuition is as follows.
Detecting the presence of the collateral channel requires a positive relationship between a firm’s
RE Value and investment. There are two categories of observations in the data that weaken this
link. First, the observations with very high investment rates but very small RE Value (i.e., they
essentially do not own real estate). Second, the observations with very high RE Value but low
or moderate investment rates. A third category, those observations with high RE Value and high
investment rates, tend to support the positive link. When the data is unaltered, the effect of
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Table 1: The Impact of Winsorizing Data on CST’s results
Winsorized Data Unaltered Data
RE Value (MSA Res. Prices), β 0.056*** −0.0002
MSA Res. Prices, γ -0.0176 85.234
Cash 0.030*** -0.115
Market/Book 0.063*** -0.021
Init. Controls × MSA Res. Prices Yes Yes
Year fixed fffects Yes Yes
Firm fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 16,320 16.320
Adjusted R2 0.317 0.060
Notes: Instrumental variables (IV) estimation (Saiz elasticity × interest rate).
the first two categories dominates the third as there is a large number of observations in those
two categories (1479 observations) compared to the third (21 observations). With Winsorizing, a
significant bias in introduced in favour of strengthening a positive relationship—the evidence for
the collateral channel—between RE Value and INV.
Figure 1 shows the effects of Winsorization on the main variables of interest after applying the
cut-offs shown in (3) and (4). It is helpful to link the quadrants with type I- and type II- errors.
The null hypothesis is that a firm’s RE Value does not matter for investment, or that β = 0. The
alternative is that β > 0. Winsorization, in effect, increases the chance of a type I error of rejecting
the null hypothesis when it is true. As indicated in the upper-left quadrant I, Winsorization pushed
down 716 observations with very high investment rates and very low to moderate actual RE Values
(i.e., when the data is unaltered) to the threshold level. This transformation biases the data towards
finding a positive relationship between RE Value and investment, or the evidence in favour of the
collateral channel. Similarly for the 763 observations in the lower-right quadrant II, pushing high
RE Values lower with corresponding low to moderate investment also increases the chance of a
type I error and favours finding evidence for the the collateral channel.
There are 21 observations that fall into the top-right quadrant III. Pushing these values down
and to the left increases the chance of a type II error of not rejecting the null hypothesis when it is
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Figure 1: The Effect of Winsorization on Investment and RE Value
716 high investment observations
favour of the collateral channel
21 high investment, high RE Value observations
collateral channel
763 high RE Value observation
favour of the collateral channel
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false. In principle, this would be a good robustness check for CST. If the evidence for the collateral
channel were present in the unaltered data and survived after pushing down these observations,
that would indeed indicate the statistical robustness of the results. But as mentioned above, there
are only 21 observations in this category, too few to offset the bias due the relatively large number
of observations in quadrants I and II.
B. National, Rather Than Local, Shocks to Real Estate Prices Matter for Investment
CST’s identification strategy is based on the comparison of investment by land-holding firms
across areas with different variations in real estate prices (page 2382). We re-examine the robustness
of this identification to the presence of aggregate real estate shocks that are common to all real
estate holding firms.
An Econometric Correction to Eliminate Bias:
Before proceeding, we make an econometric correction to CST’s baseline specification (1). The
reason for this correction is as follows: The variable of interest, RE Valueit, is an interaction term
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between (i) the initial real estate value ˜REValuei,1993 normalized by PPEi,t−1 and (ii) P lt , given as
(5) REValueit = P
l
t ×
˜REValuei,1993
PPEi,t−1
≡ P lt ×REValuei,1993
where RE Valuei,1993 is the the initial market value of real estate in 1993 normalized by lagged
Property Plant and Equipment, PPEi,t−1.3 Balli and Sørensen (2013) show that if a regression has
an interaction term, say X1∗X2, then the main terms X1 and X2 should be included in the empirical
specification. If the main terms are not included then the interaction effect may be significant due
to left-out variable bias. Since CST include only one of the main terms P lt but not RE Valuei,1993,
it is likely that the estimated β is subject to this source of bias. Following Balli and Sørensen’s
(2013) recommendation, therefore, we include RE Valuei,1993 in the empirical specification.
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Aggregate Shocks to Real Estate Holding Firms:
We introduce the aggregate shocks that are common to all real estate holding firms by consid-
ering firms’ real estate value at the national price level denoted as PNt .
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(6) REValueNit = P
N
t ×
˜REValuei,1993
PPEi,t−1
≡ PNt ×REValuei,1993
The modified specification that we estimate is
(7) INV lit = αi + δt + βREValueit + φREValue
N
it + γP
l
t + ψREValuei,1993 + controlsit + εit
We do not include PNt by itself in specification (7) as it is perfectly collinear with the year fixed
effects δt which is already present in the regression.
The results in Table 2 show that even when the data is Winsorized as in CST, the main quanti-
tative finding—the 6 cents sensitivity of investment to a $1 increase in the real value of collateral a
firm actually owns—is not robust to the econometric correction of their baseline specification and to
3The market value of real estate a firm owns can be estimated from balance sheet data only up to
1993 because that was the last year accumulated depreciation was recorded in COMPUSTAT. Thus, RE
Valuei,1993 measures the initial market value of real estate estimated from balance sheet data and RE Valueit
measures movements in the market value of those specific real estate assets coming from movements in P lt .
This data limitation is why CST restrict their sample to active firms in 1993.
4To ensure that the main term matches what is in the interaction term, we Winsorize RE Valuei,1993 and
then multiply by P lt .
5Our national real estate price index is constructed by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight.
This is the same data source used by CST to measure MSA level real estate prices, P lt .
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Table 2: Real Estate Prices and Investment Behaviour: Local versus Aggre-
gate Real Estate Shocks
Winsorized Data Unaltered Data
RE Value (MSA Res. Prices), β -0.0164 -0.0154
RE Value (National Prices), φ 0.0452* -0.0576
MSA Res. Prices, γ 0.001 54.221
RE Value (1993), ψ 0.007 0.0522
Cash 0.030*** -0.115
Market/Book 0.062*** -0.022
Init. Controls x MS Res. Prices Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 16,320 16,320
Adjusted R2 0.318 0.060
Notes: Instrumental variables (IV) estimation (Saiz elasticity × interest rate). *** denotes
statistical significance at the 1% level, * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level.
the presence of aggregate real estate shocks common to all real estate holding firms. The sensitivity
of investment to local real estate shocks, as in CST, is −1.6 cents and statistically insignificant while
the sensitivity to aggregate real estate shocks is 4.5 cents, and statistically significant at the 10%
level.6 This finding shows that CST’s identification strategy based on local variations in real estate
prices does not identify a firm’s investment sensitivity to each additional dollar of real estate that
the firm actually owns.7 Again, in the unaltered data there is no evidence for the collateral channel
as shown in the third column of Table 2.
III. Conclusion
We re-examine the finding of Chaney, Sraer and Thesmar (2012) that over the 1993–2007 period, a
6For the Winsorized data, when only the econometric correction is considered in the empirical specifica-
tion, the estimated sensitivity reduces by half from approximately 6 cents as in Table 1 to approximately
3 cents. In the unaltered data, there is no evidence for the sensitivity of investment to real estate shocks.
These results are available upon request.
7We also checked whether land holding firms make larger debt issuances and repayments when the value
of their real estate increases (Table 8 in CST). The results for local shocks to real estate value are statistically
insignificant, similar to those in Table (2) for the Winsorized data.
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$1 increase in collateral (the value of real estate a firm actually owns) leads the representative US
public corporation to raise its investment by $0.06. We first demonstrate that data Winsorization
induces a strong bias in favour of finding this result. There is no relationship ($0.00 per $1) between
the value of real estate a firm owns and its investment in the unaltered data. We further show that
even with Winsorized data, corporate investment is affected by aggregate real estate shocks instead
of local real estate shocks. Our finding, therefore, shows that CST’s identification based on local
real estate price variation does not provide evidence on the collateral channel.
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